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Abstract
Learning by following explicit advice is fundamental for human cultural evolution, yet the neurobiology of adaptive social
learning is largely unknown. Here, we used simulations to analyze the adaptive value of social learning mechanisms,
computational modeling of behavioral data to describe cognitive mechanisms involved in social learning, and model-based
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the neurobiological basis of following advice. One-time advice
received before learning had a sustained influence on people’s learning processes. This was best explained by social
learning mechanisms implementing a more positive evaluation of the outcomes from recommended options. Computer
simulations showed that this ‘‘outcome-bonus’’ accumulates more rewards than an alternative mechanism implementing
higher initial reward expectation for recommended options. fMRI results revealed a neural outcome-bonus signal in the
septal area and the left caudate. This neural signal coded rewards in the absence of advice, and crucially, it signaled greater
positive rewards for positive and negative feedback after recommended rather than after non-recommended choices.
Hence, our results indicate that following advice is intrinsically rewarding. A positive correlation between the model’s
outcome-bonus parameter and amygdala activity after positive feedback directly relates the computational model to brain
activity. These results advance the understanding of social learning by providing a neurobiological account for adaptive
learning from advice.
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Introduction
The nature and level of social learning in human societies is
unmatched in the animal world. Especially when decisions are
difficult, people rely on advice or recommendations regarding a
decision or course of action [1]. Accumulating knowledge through
social learning (particularly advice taking) is uniquely human and
fundamental to the evolution of human culture [2–4], and it is
plausible that genetic adaptations to social learning evolved in
humans [5]. Cumulative social learning strongly relies on advice
taking, which transmits social information more reliably than
imitation or observational learning. For the individual, heeding
advice can be especially useful when mistakes are costly and social
information is accurate [4,6]. Accordingly, advice taking affects
many domains of learning and decision making, such as
cooperation [6,7], financial decisions [8], or consumer behavior
[9]. For instance, people do not discover a healthy diet by trial and
error but combine recommendations from others with their own
experiences to choose their meals.
The influence of advice and social learning in general does not
require direct personal interaction but can be observed in
situations where social information is transmitted by observation
or by written or spoken advice [10–12]. Recent fMRI experiments
provided the first insights into the neurobiological mechanisms
underlying social learning. Social prediction error signals are used
to learn about the probability of good advice from advisors with
sometimes cooperative and sometimes uncooperative motives [13]
and determine to what extent initial judgments are adjusted based
on social information [14]. However, these results do not provide a
mechanistic explanation for the often-observed sustained influence
of advice or, more generally, the human propensity for social
learning. In particular, it remains unclear if and how the brain
implements an adaptive social learning mechanism to combine
supportive advice with individual information gained through
personal experience.
Reinforcement learning models [15] can provide hypotheses
about the influence of advice on decision making, especially when
decisions are based on past experiences. These models specify
distinct sub-mechanisms of learning, such as the initial evaluation
of choice options or the repeated evaluation of choice outcomes,
which have different behavioral [16] and neuronal signatures [17]
that may be separately influenced by advice. Behavioral studies
have shown that the human propensity for following advice could
be explained by its influence on the evaluation of outcomes rather
than on initial reward expectations or choice processes [12,18].
This influence is described best by an outcome-bonus model [12],
which postulates a learning mechanism in which a reward bonus is
added to both good and bad outcomes of recommended options.
More specifically, rewards from recommended options lead to
stronger positive reinforcements than rewards with the same
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Correspondingly, punishments from recommended options inhibit
the choice of that option less than punishments with the same
objective disutility from non-recommended options. In fact, when
the punishment from a recommended option is smaller than the
size of the outcome-bonus, the punishment may still lead to a
positive reinforcement. The behavioral evidence in favor of the
outcome-bonus model suggests that the neurobiological imple-
mentation of advice-following relies on the brain’s reward system.
Neurophysiological experiments in monkeys and fMRI experi-
ments in humans [15,19] consistently report reward representation
in targets of dopaminergic midbrain projection neurons. Positive
outcomes (rewards) elicit an increase in blood-oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) responses in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC) [20,21], the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
[22,23], the amygdala [24], and the ventral striatum (VST) [25–
27]. Of particular interest in the context of social learning is the
septal area, because it signals reward [28] and triggers release of
oxytocin [29], which in turn is known to enhance trusting behavior
[30]. Hence, we predicted that positive outcomes from a
recommended decision would lead to greater positive BOLD
responses than positive outcomes from non-recommended deci-
sions in these reward sensitive regions. Furthermore, whereas
negative outcomes should lead to a negative BOLD response after
choosing a non-recommended option, negative outcomes after
choosing a recommended option should lead to an attenuated
BOLD response decrease or even to a positive BOLD response.
Based on these predictions, we investigated if and how the
outcome-bonus is implemented in the brain. In addition, we
compared computational models and used simulations to test
whether the outcome-bonus model provides the best explanation
of behavior and if it is an adaptive social learning mechanism. We
show that, compared to alternative social-learning mechanisms,
the outcome-bonus is more adaptive and can better account for
the observed behavior. Moreover, we identified a neural outcome-
bonus signal in the septal area and the left caudate.
Results
Sustained Influence of Advice Is Explained by the
Outcome-Bonus
Participants in the experiment learned that advice (i.e., a form
on which the advisor marked which option the advice receiver
should choose) was given from a second group of participants, who
had previous experience with the task and were motivated to give
good advice (see Figure 1 and Text S1 for details). Of the 21
participants, 16 received good advice. Regardless of good or bad
advice, participants chose the recommended deck (41.5% of all
choices) twice as often as they chose the non-recommended deck
with the same payoff distribution (21.5% of all choices; p,.0001).
Notably, this effect of advice was not limited to the beginning of
the experiment, but rather was sustained; Figure 2A shows that
participants robustly preferred the recommended deck to the non-
recommended deck with the identical payoff distribution through-
out the entire experiment. This result is consistent with the
outcome-bonus but not with the assumption that advice influences
only the evaluation of choice options prior to individual learning.
In the first half and, to a lesser extent, the second half of the
trials, recipients of good advice chose the good decks more
frequently than recipients of bad advice. The fact that this effect is
greater in the first half (p=.039, effect size r=.39) than in the
second half of the experiment (p=.137, effect size r=.25) indicates
that bad advice harmed learning more during the first half of the
experiment (c.f. Figure S2). The relatively weaker influence of bad
advice in the second half of the experiment shows that decisions
were made based on a combination of advice and individual
learning, because only individual learning by the participants
receiving bad advice can explain why they performed nearly as
well as receivers of good advice in the second half of the
experiment.
We evaluated the outcome-bonus model quantitatively by
comparing it with alternative models based on standard model
selection criteria. The results provide strong empirical support for
the outcome-bonus mechanism as essential to explain social
learning. In particular, we derived the Bayes factor from the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [31]. With this model
selection criterion, we found strong evidence in favor of the
outcome-bonus model and a combined model implementing an
outcome-bonus and higher initial reward expectations for the
recommended deck (henceforth prior+outcome-bonus model).
Figure 2B illustrates that, when considering the models’ Bayes
factors, these models predict the observed behavior equally well
and much better than alternative models. Additionally, we
compared the models by their Akaike information criterion
(AIC) as an additional model selection criterion. Here, the
prior+outcome-bonus model was the best model. Moreover,
comparing the outcome-bonus, the prior, and the prior+out-
come-bonus model against each other illustrates that removing the
assumption of an outcome-bonus hurts the model fit more than
removing the prior. When comparing the AIC (or BIC) values of
the prior, the outcome-bonus, and the prior+outcome-bonus
models with eight alternative models on a participant-by-
participant level, the prior model is on average better for 59.7%
(or 57.6%) of participants, the outcome-bonus model for 62.3% (or
64.4%), and the prior+outcome-bonus model for 67.1% (or
47.5%) (see Text S1 for details). Like the previous model
comparison results, these comparisons underline the relevance of
the outcome-bonus mechanism.
Simulated learning paths of the models illustrate that the
outcome-bonus model, but not the prior model, predicts our key
behavioral result, namely the sustained effect of advice on
Author Summary
Learning by following advice is fundamental for human
cultural evolution. Yet it is largely unknown how the brain
implements advice-taking in order to maximize rewards.
Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and behavioral experiments to study how people
use one-off advice. We find that advice had a sustained
effect on choices and modulated learning in two ways.
First, participants initially assumed that the recommended
option was most beneficial. Second, and more importantly,
gains and losses obtained after following advice received
an ‘‘outcome-bonus,’’ in which they were evaluated more
positively than after not following advice. In other words,
following advice was in general intrinsically rewarding.
Computer simulations showed that the outcome-bonus is
adaptive, because it benefits from good advice and limits
the effect of bad advice. The fMRI analysis revealed a
neural outcome-bonus signal in the septal area and left
caudate head, structures previously implicated in trust and
reward based learning. Participants with greater outcome-
bonuses showed a greater gain-signal increase after
following advice in the amygdala, a structure implicated
in processing emotions and social information. In sum,
these results suggest that decision makers adaptively
combine advice and individual learning with a social
learning mechanism in which advice modulates the neural
reward response.
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counterintuitive that the outcome-bonus is assumed to stay
constant throughout the learning process. However, dynamic
versions of the outcome-bonus model and the prior+outcome-
bonus model, in which the outcome-bonus increases with time
after good advice and decreases with time after bad advice,
describe learning more poorly than the models using a constant
outcome-bonus. Alternatively, advice could only influence the
evaluation of gains or losses. These alternative models, however,
again fitted the observed learning processes less well than the
original outcome-bonus model (see Text S1 for details). In sum,
regardless of the model selection criterion, the change of prior
evaluations of options and more importantly the outcome-bonus
mechanism are crucial constituents of descriptive social learning
models for the influence of advice on learning. Because the
prior+outcome-bonus model explained the data altogether best,
we used predictions and parameters of this model in the fMRI
analysis.
The Outcome-Bonus Is an Adaptive Social Learning
Mechanism
The outcome-bonus mechanism may be crucial to explain
learning processes because it helps people to solve the learning task
successfully. Indeed, when advice is more likely to be good than
bad and the task is difficult and long (as was the case in our
experiment), the outcome-bonus model is generally more adaptive
(i.e., leading to higher average rewards) than the prior model
because it ensures a lasting influence of good advice.
Beyond this basic insight, the simulation results depicted in
Figure 3A show that, when good and bad advice are equally likely,
the outcome-bonus model performs worse than the prior model
only in a situation where at the same time (a) learning is difficult,
and (b) the outcome-bonus is so large that recommended bad
options are evaluated more positively than the objectively good
options. Crucially, however, Figure 3A also shows that, in most
situations, the outcome-bonus model outperforms the prior model
when good and bad advice is equally likely. When advice is bad,
the outcome-bonus model performs better because the prior model
learns only late—after the wrong initial expectation for the
recommended deck has been unlearned—which options are best
(c.f. inset in Figure 3B). The advantage of the outcome-bonus
model after bad advice is particularly strong for easier tasks where
individual learning is relatively successful, because it does not
interfere strongly with individual learning, whereas the prior does
(see also Text S1). When advice is good, the outcome-bonus model
performs better because it leads to a preference for a good option
long after the effect of higher initial expectations has decayed (c.f.
Figure 3B).
The superiority of the outcome-bonus model is notable, as the
prior model resembles more a Bayesian approach, in which advice
as prior information should influence the initial evaluation of
choice options. However, whereas the prior model learns the
expected values more accurately in the long run, cumulative
rewards do depend on the choices made based on the learned
values. The sustained overestimation of the rewards from a good
option implemented by the outcome-bonus model (after good
advice) helps to make the choice of that option occur more
frequently and ultimately helps to accumulate more rewards.
Following Advice Modulates BOLD Responses in the
Reward System
We used fMRI to test the prediction that rewards from
recommended versus non-recommended options would lead to
greater BOLD responses in reward-sensitive brain regions.
Regions implementing the outcome-bonus (outcome-bonus re-
gions) should fulfill two conditions. First, when advice is followed,
gains should lead to a greater increase in BOLD signals and losses
should lead to a smaller decrease in BOLD signals (compared to
Figure 1. Experimental design. The task implemented key features of a realistic social learning situation, in which the learner receives well-
intentioned advice prior to individual learning, but good advice is not certain. (A) In the learning task, participants repeatedly chose from one of four
card decks associated with different gains and losses (c.f. Figure S1), with the goal of maximizing cumulative rewards. Each trial started with the
presentation of the four decks. Participants had 2.5 s to choose a deck. After a variable fixation interval, feedback was presented for 2.5 s. (B) Advisors
performed the 4-armed bandit task in the laboratory and indicated their advice on a form, which advice-receivers obtained before performing the
task in the scanner.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001089.g001
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outcome-bonus regions should be gain-preferring; that is, these
regions should show a regular reward signal with an increased
positive BOLD signal after gains and a reduced BOLD signal after
losses [32]. Only one cluster comprising the septal area and the left
caudate head showed the predicted effect of advice (max. z-score
=3.49; Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI] coordinates: x=4,
y=2, z=4; see Figure 4A and 4B) and was also gain-preferring,
suggesting that this region implements the outcome-bonus. This
outcome-bonus implementation cannot be explained in terms of
different payoff distributions of the good and bad options because
the experiment was designed such that good and bad decks were
equally likely to lead to gains or losses (although the magnitudes of
gains and losses differed). Moreover, because our fMRI analysis
controlled for both different gain and loss magnitudes of good and
bad options as well as different prediction error magnitudes of the
advice and no-advice condition, the result can neither be ascribed
to the fact that advisors recommended good options more
frequently than bad options nor to differences in prediction errors
elicited by feedbacks from the different choice options.
For more detailed insights into how the brain evaluates
outcomes that are dependent on advice, we contrasted feedback-
related BOLD responses separately for gains and losses in reward
signaling regions after following and not following advice (see
Figure 4C and 4D, and Text S1). For losses, we found greater
BOLD responses after following advice in two gain-preferring
regions: the VMPFC (max. z-score =3.35; x=210, y = 52,
z=218) and the left caudate (max. z-score =3.23; x=216,
y=20, z=26). However, these regions did not provide a complete
outcome-bonus signal because the BOLD response to positive
feedback was not greater after following advice. One cluster in the
orbitofrontal cortex also showed a weaker BOLD signal reduction
for losses after following advice (max. z-score =3.35; x=16,
y=28, z=212), but voxels in this region were not gain-preferring.
For gains, we found that the difference between activity in the left
amygdala after following or not following advice correlates with
the outcome-bonus parameter of the prior+outcome-bonus model
(max. z-score =3.02; x=226, y=24, z=214), suggesting that
the amygdala also implements the outcome-bonus.
To investigate how advice modulates standard brain responses
to rewards, we investigated advice-dependent changes in brain
regions that showed greater activity after not following advice for
gains compared to losses. Such reward signals were identified in
the VMPFC, the ventral striatum (VST), and the right insula. The
parameter estimates of these regions for gains and losses after
following and not following advice show that advice led to an
attenuation of the BOLD response in the VMPFC and VST, such
that gain and loss signals are closer to the baseline BOLD response
after advice was followed (see Figure 5).
To check the robustness of the neural outcome-bonus signal
resulting from the effect of advice, we performed supplementary
fMRI analyses. First, the above described analysis did not reveal a
Figure 2. Behavioral and modeling results. (A) Participants’ average choice proportions (running average of 11 trials 62 standard errors) for the
recommended and the non-recommended corresponding deck. This sustained influence of advice is consistent with the outcome-bonus mechanism,
but not with the assumption that advice influences only the evaluation of choice options prior to individual learning (see below for detailed
description of the social learning models). (B) The panel shows Bayes factors comparing the two models with the lowest Bayesian information
criterion (outcome-bonus model and prior+outcome-bonus model) with the other models. The Bayes factor shows how much more likely the two
best models are as compared to the model in the respective row. For instance, the last row shows that the prior+outcome-bonus model is about 30
times and the outcome-bonus model is about 40 times more likely than the individual learning model. Models assuming the influence of advice on
evaluation of either gains or losses performed worse than the original outcome-bonus model. Moreover, more complex models implementing a
dynamic outcome-bonus do not predict the data better than the simpler models with stable outcome-bonus. The inset (same order of models on the
x-axis) shows that these results also hold when using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) as a model selection criterion. Because the AIC imposes
smaller penalties for additional free parameters (for our sample size), models with a dynamic outcome-bonus perform better according to the AIC
criterion. In sum, regardless of the model selection criterion, an outcome-bonus and a prior mechanism are implemented in the best models, but a
dynamic or payoff-selective outcome-bonus mechanism is not.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001089.g002
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because it included separate regressors for positive versus negative
payoffs, which captured the variance associated with positive
versus negative prediction errors. Indeed, a supplementary fMRI
analysis tailored to reveal a prediction error signal identified
correlations with prediction errors in the VST (Figure S6A).
Importantly, this analysis also revealed the above reported effect of
advice on reward signals in the septal area and the left caudate
head (Figure S6B). Second, to further investigate the existence of a
sustained effect of advice on learning and the neural correlates
underlying this effect, we performed another fMRI analysis that
tested whether the outcome-bonus changed from the first to the
second half of the trials in which advice was followed. Consistent
with our modeling results showing that models with a dynamic
outcome-bonus do not explain behavior substantially better than
models with a constant outcome-bonus, we did not find a change
in the neural outcome-bonus signal in the septal area over time.
However, we found reduced BOLD responses for feedback after
following advice in the paracingulate gyrus and the superior
temporal sulcus (see Figures S7 and S8 for details), which are
commonly associated with theory-of-mind processes and trusting
behavior [33,34].
Discussion
Taken together, behavioral, modeling, simulation, and neuro-
imaging data provide strong convergent evidence for a sustained
effect of well-intentioned advice on decision making, which can be
explained by an outcome-bonus model for following advice.
Behavioral data showed that advice had a long-lasting influence on
decision making and learning. Simulations suggest that the
outcome-bonus is an adaptive social learning mechanism in a
broad range of social learning environments. The model
comparison showed that the outcome-bonus is necessary to
explain the behavioral effect of advice. fMRI data supported this
conclusion, as advice modulated reward-related brain activity so
that the gain-sensitive septal area and the left caudate head
showed a greater reward signal after following rather than not
following advice; even negative outcomes elicited a positive reward
response when advice was followed.
One feature of the experiment was that participants controlled
when to follow advice, so that advice-following trials were not
randomized across the experiment. Hence, additional factors
might have influenced the observed differences between following
and not following advice. Future experiments that randomly
interleave trials of tasks with and without advice should further
investigate this issue.
Still, the current experiment allowed us to rule out a number of
alternative mechanisms that could a priori explain advice
following. Among these, the brain could provide a greater
expected reward signal for the recommended option. Alternative-
ly, choosing the non-recommended option could be associated
with anticipated regret, or negative feedback for the recommended
option could lead to particularly strong regret. Moreover,
outcomes from the recommended option could be processed with
greater attention. Our behavioral and fMRI results do not support
Figure 3. Adaptive value of social learning models. We used computer simulations to compare the average rewards gained by the prior model
and the outcome-bonus model when performing a 4-armed bandit task with 100 trials after receiving advice about which bandit has the highest
payoffs. To examine the models’ performance over a range of learning settings, simulations were repeated for different task difficulties, levels of social
influence, probabilities of correct advice, and learning parameters (see Text S1). (A) Difference in average payoffs across learning environments for
50% good advice. Each cell depicts the difference in average payoffs of the two models for a particular combination of task difficulty and social
influence. The difference was computed from 1,000 simulated learning tasks for each model, whereby each model received good advice in half of the
tasks. Difficulty, defined as difference in mean payoffs divided by payoff variance, is varied on the y-axis. Social influence, defined as either the
magnitude of outcome-bonus (bb) or higher initial reward expectation for the recommended option (bp), is varied on the x-axis. The outcome-bonus
model is more likely to choose a highly rewarded option (and thus accumulates most reward) for most levels of task difficulty and social influence,
with exception of the combination of bad advice in a difficult task with strong social influence. (B) Learning curves show that the outcome-bonus
model is better because it profits from good advice in the long run, even if individual learning already leads to a clear preference for a good bandit.
The inset depicts cumulative rewards for both models. After bad advice, cumulative payoffs are reduced less for the outcome-bonus model
compared to the prior model (see inset). In contrast, the prior model does not profit from good advice in the long run, and cumulative payoffs are
greatly reduced after bad advice (see also Figures S3–S5). The inset also highlights that bad advice harms the prior model because it abolishes
choices of the better option until the prior expectation induced by advice has been unlearned.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001089.g003
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PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 5 June 2011 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e1001089Figure 4. Neural basis of an outcome-bonus after following advice. (A) Feedback after following advice led to greater activity in the left
caudate head and septal area. (B) Parameter estimates (PE) of the General Linear Model analysis suggest that the outcome-bonus is implemented in
the septal area and left caudate as a greater increase in BOLD signal for gains and as a smaller decrease in BOLD signal for losses after following
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characterized by a greater reward anticipation signal in the VST
or the VMPFC when participants chose the recommended deck.
Rather, the change in BOLD signal in a number of brain regions
was smaller when choices were made and advice was followed (see
Figure S9). This replicates the findings of an earlier study, which
examined the effect of advice on investment decisions [35] and
reported reduced activity in decision-related regions during advice
trials. We did not find a greater change in the BOLD signal in
regret-associated regions like the anterior cingulate cortex or the
orbitofrontal cortex [36] during the choice or during the
processing of negative feedback from non-recommended decks.
Our fMRI results are also inconsistent with an attention account
as we found that the reward signal in the VMPFC, as identified by
contrasting gains and losses after not following advice, had a
greater magnitude after not following compared to following
advice. Similar results were reported for a study that compared
orbitofrontal reward signals of self-determined and instructed
choices [37]. Finally, simple attention effects cannot be reconciled
readily neither with our behavioral finding that participants still
learn which of the non-recommended decks is better nor with the
notion that they prefer the recommended to the non-recom-
mended of two options with the same expected value. Instead, our
results suggest that advice modulates reward processing in two
ways. First, the standard reward signal in the VMPFC and VST is
attenuated. Second, the septal area and the left caudate head
implement an outcome-bonus for recommended options. Impor-
tantly, the outcome-bonus signal does not replace the standard
reward signal but seems to influence learning in addition to an
attenuated standard reward signal.
Prior neuroimaging research on decision making in social
contexts addressed the differences between social and nonsocial
cognition [38] and the computational processes underlying
decision making and learning in a social context [39]. Notably,
recent studies showed that a social prediction error signal predicts
future conformity with humans and computers [14] and that,
when advice is given on a trial-by-trial level during strategic
interaction, the brain tracks the quality of advice through social
reinforcement learning signals [13].
We discovered that, on a neurobiological level, the human
propensity for following trustworthy advice could be explained by
the modulation of the neural reward response. Importantly, the
outcome-bonus does not replace the standard reward signal.
Instead, it supplements a still present, though attenuated, learning
signal in the VMPFC and the VST (where a partial outcome-
bonus is implemented). More specifically, only the septal area and
the left caudate implement the full outcome-bonus signal. These
regions signaled a more positive evaluation of outcomes after
following advice and were also sensitive to rewards after not
following advice. Notably, the septal area is ideally suited as the
neural substrate of the outcome-bonus, because it contains
neurons that mediate reinforcement [28] and project to nuclei in
the hypothalamus that release oxytocin [29], a neurotransmitter
known to facilitate trust [30]. Accordingly, a recent study showed
greater activity in the septal area during trusting behavior [34].
Hence, our findings suggest that an intrinsic reward signal in the
Figure 5. Advice modulated the standard BOLD response to rewards. (A) Regions showing greater BOLD response to positive than to
negative feedback after not following advice. Top left: VMPFC (max. z-score=3.50, x=24, y=50, z=218); top right: Left VST (max z-score =3.73,
x=216, y=12, z=210); bottom left: Insular cortex (max z-score =3.33, x=38, y=8,z=216). (B) Estimated parameter estimates show that following
advice led to an attenuation of the standard reward signal (as identified from trials in which participants did not follow advice) in the VMPFC and the
VST.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001089.g005
advice. (C and D) VST, VMPFC, and OFC showed a greater reduction in BOLD response to negative outcomes if these followed deviation from advice.
(E) Participants with higher outcome-bonus parameters showed greater increases in BOLD signal in the left lateral amygdala for gains after following
advice compared to after not following advice. (F) Scatter plot illustrating this correlation (1 outlier participant removed). Note that all regions
implementing the outcome-bonus are gain preferring after not following advice, in that they all show an increase in BOLD signal to gains and a
decrease in BOLD signal to losses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001089.g004
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advice-following. The correlation of the outcome-bonus estimated
for individual participants and the difference of positive reward
signals in the amygdala after following versus not following advice
suggests that this structure is also involved in maintaining the
influence of advice. This result is plausible, as the amygdala is
known to be involved in the detection of trust from faces [40]
during social interaction [41] and in the generation of reward
prediction errors during learning [39,42].
The notion of intrinsic reward for following advice may seem
counterintuitive, particularly because a Bayesian approach would
suggest that advice influences expectations prior to individual
experience. From an adaptive perspective, the relevant criterion to
choose a social learning mechanism is the amount of reward that
can be accumulated using a specific mechanism. Bayesian models
are optimal in the sense that they accurately learn expected
payoffs. This does not imply, however, that these models also
accumulate most rewards because the obtained rewards depend
also on how choices are derived from expected payoffs. Hence,
when advice is predominantly good, the outcome-bonus model
performs well as it biases choices persistently in the direction of the
recommended option, whereas the prior model affects choices only
initially.
Another interesting result is that the models implementing a
dynamic outcome-bonus did not explain participants’ behavior as
well as the models implementing a stable outcome-bonus. We
ascribe this to characteristics of our task designed to mimic everyday
situations of advice following, in which the task at hand is often
difficult, and the recommendation comes from a competent and
motivated advisor. Hence, future research is needed to show
whether the influence of advice is stable or dynamic when the task is
relatively easy or the competence of the advisor is less uncertain.
The notion of intrinsic reward for following advice is consistent
with both a learning and an evolutionary perspective. The effect of
advice on reward representation suggests that following advice acts
similarly to a secondary reinforcer. Following advice alone, which
is usually followed by positive outcomes, elicits a reward response.
Likewise, it has been proposed that imitation—another form of
social learning—has the quality of a secondary reinforcer for
children, who frequently experience that imitation leads to positive
outcomes [43]. Mathematical analysis shows that the propensity
for social learning can evolve on the population level in the
environmental conditions that characterized the era of human
evolutionary adaptation [2,4]. Moreover, social learning can solve
problems that individual learning cannot, such as cooperation in
social dilemmas or the accumulation of knowledge across
generations [2,6,7,44]. Therefore, it seems plausible that humans
have evolved mechanisms for social learning [5,45]. We
complement these explanations by providing a neurobiological
account of an adaptive social learning mechanism, which can also
explain the human propensity for social learning. Importantly,
insights into the neurobiological mechanisms underlying social
learning can pave the way for a targeted search of genetic
adaptations to social learning. Based on our results, one could
speculate that genetic adaptation to social learning involves genes
that modulate reward processing.
In conclusion, we present evidence that the brain’s reward
system implements an adaptive social learning mechanism by
generating a greater reward signal for outcomes received after
following trustworthy advice. This outcome-bonus could also
explain maladaptive social learning, which should occur particu-
larly when the difference between choice options is hard to detect
or when social influence is strong. Indeed, others have reported
that decision makers will follow advice that implies sub-optimal
decisions when decisions are difficult or contain a dilemma [7] and
that social influence determines preferential choice beyond the
quality of consumed goods [46]. Fundamentally, our results
advance the understanding of social learning by providing a
neurobiological account of the human propensity for social
learning and of the sustained influence of social information on
learning and decision making.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-one right-handed healthy participants performed a
four-armed bandit task with 168 trials while being scanned in an
MRI scanner. All participants were free of neurological and
psychiatric history and gave written informed consent in accord
with local ethics. An additional 10 participants were recruited to
function as advisors for participants in the fMRI experiment.
Task
Participants in the fMRI experiment received advice from a
randomly selected advisor before entering the MRI scanner. To
establish incentives for following advice, we truthfully informed
participants that the advisor had performed the same task before
and that the advisor’s payment partially depended on the
receiver’s earnings. This design comes close to natural settings of
advice-giving and -taking, where the advisor is motivated to give
good advice, but the advice-receiver still cannot be entirely sure
whether she receives the best advice.
In the learning task (performed in the MRI scanner),
participants repeatedly chose from four card decks and received
feedback after each trial (Figure 1 and Text S1). The four decks
were comprised of two identical ‘‘good decks’’ with a high positive
expected value and two identical ‘‘bad decks’’ with a low positive
expected value (see Figure S1). Therefore, preference for the
recommended deck over the corresponding deck with the same
payoff distribution would be a clear indicator of the influence of
advice. To examine the effect of advice on rewards and
punishments, each card deck generated 50% positive and 50%
negative payoffs across all trials. The bad decks had slightly higher
gains but much larger losses than the good decks.
Social Learning Models
To investigate the influence of advice on learning, we first
compared how a standard reinforcement learning model, an
‘‘outcome-bonus’’ model, a ‘‘prior’’ model, and a combined
‘‘prior+outcome-bonus’’ model described participants’ choices.
The standard reinforcement learning model assigns each option
i an expected reward qi(t). On the basis of the expected rewards,
choices are made according to the softmax choice rule [47], which
determines the probability pi(t) of choosing option i of the J options
in round t as follows:
pi t ðÞ ~
exp½t:qi(t) 
PJ
j~1 exp½t:qi(t) 
, ð1Þ
where t is a sensitivity parameter determining how likely the
option with the largest expected reward will be chosen. Note that
this choice function holds for all trials except the first, for which we
assumed that the decision maker chooses the recommended
option. This assumption was implemented in all tested models.
After a choice is made, the expected rewards are updated on the
basis of the prediction error. That is, the deviation between the
expected and actually received reward:
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where ri(t) is the reward obtained from choosing deck i in trial t and
a is the learning rate that determines the impact of the prediction
error in the updating process.
The outcome-bonus model differs from the standard reinforce-
ment-learning model by changing the reinforcement of outcomes
from recommended options. Accordingly, the updating rule
(Equation 2) was modified such that when the recommended
option was chosen, a constant bonus was added to the objective
reward:
qi tz1 ðÞ ~qi t ðÞ za ri t ðÞ zg(i)mbb{qi t ðÞ ½  , ð3Þ
where g(i) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if option i
is recommended and the value 0 if option i is not recommended,
bb is a free outcome-bonus parameter capturing the level of social
influence, and m is the expected payoff from choosing randomly
among all options and serves as a normalization constant to allow
for comparison across tasks with different payoff magnitudes.
The prior model assumes a higher initial reward expectation for
the recommended choice option. Hence, the initial reward
expectation in the prior model is defined as qi 1 ðÞ ~g(i)mbpN,
where bp captures the social influence on the prior expectations
and N is the number of trials in the learning experiment, which we
chose as a simple scaling factor, allowing for the comparison of the
weight of the prior compared to the payoff that can be obtained in
the experiment. For the combined prior+outcome-bonus model,
both the initial reward expectation and the outcome-bonus were
used to modify the evaluation of the choice options.
Additionally to the aforementioned models, we examined (a) a
dynamic version of the outcome-bonus that becomes increasingly
large after good advice and increasingly small and negative after
bad advice. We also tested various other modifications of the
outcome-bonus model, which (b) combined dynamic outcome-
bonus and higher prior reward expectation for the recommended
option, restricted the outcome-bonus to only (c) gains or (d) losses,
(e) assumed that losses after following advice are processed as zero
payoffs (see Text S1 for details).
For all models, we estimated the parameter values that
maximized the log likelihood of trial-by-trial choice predictions
for each participant separately (see Text S1). Model comparison
was performed based on AIC and BIC values, which are derived
from the log likelihood but additionally penalize models with a
greater number of free parameters.
fMRI Analysis
The functional analysis was based on 12 regressors (plus six
motion-parameter regressors): Two regressors modeled the choice
of the recommended and the non-recommended option(s),
respectively. Four binary regressors modeled (a) positive and (b)
negative feedback after choosing the recommended option and (c)
positive and (d) negative feedback after non-recommended
options, respectively. An additional set of four corresponding
parametric regressors controlled for feedback magnitude. One
regressor modeled prediction errors estimated with the combined
prior+outcome-bonus model. One error regressor modeled
feedback after missed trials, in which participants made no
decisions. For group-level results, individual-level contrasts were
averaged using the FMRIB Local Analysis of Mixed Effects
module in FSL (see Text S1), and one-sample t tests were
performed at each voxel for each contrast of interest.
To identify regions implementing advice and reward-sensitive
feedback signals, we used the four regressors (a) through (d),
described above. Advice-sensitive regions were identified by the
contrast [1 1 21 21] for these regressors. To test if the resulting
functional regions of interest (ROIs) were also reward-sensitive, we
tested these voxels with the contrast [0 0 1 21], based on the
assumption that, after not following advice, feedback allows for the
identification of reward responses that are uncontaminated by
advice. An additional whole brain contrast, comparing gains and
losses after not following advice [0 0 1 21], revealed commonly
reported reward signals in the VST and the VMPFC.
Following our predictions, we investigated representations of
reward in a set of anatomically defined regions comprising the
major reward-representing areas of the brain. We defined the
reward ROIs based on the Harvard-Oxford subcortical structural
atlas and included the following anatomical regions: nucleus
accumbens, caudate, putamen, thalamus, medial frontal cortex,
and amygdala. For the amygdala, Z (Gaussianized T) statistic
images were thresholded with a small volume correction
determined by z.2.576, and a minimum cluster size of 36 voxels
determined with the AFNI AlphaSim tool (see Text S1). For the
ROI comprising all other regions, Z statistic images were
thresholded with a small volume correction determined by
z.2.576 and a minimum cluster size of 92 voxels, also determined
with the AFNI AlphaSim tool.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 The payoff distribution for the four decks in the task.
Good decks with higher average rewards were associated with
relatively low gains and with moderate losses. Bad options with
lower average rewards were associated with higher gains than the
good decks, but also with much larger losses.
(TIF)
Figure S2 The probability of choosing one of the two good
decks, separately for the first and second half of the experiment
and for participants who received good and bad advice. Black lines
indicate two standard errors of the mean. Participants who
received bad advice (n=5) generally chose the good decks less
frequently than participants who received good advice (n=16) but
also improved performance from the first to the second half.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Performance of social learning models for typical
learning parameters. Each panel shows one model’s mean
cumulative payoff on the z-axis. The levels of social influence
and task difficulty are varied across the x- and y-axis, respectively.
Difficulty is calculated as the difference in the mean payoff of the
good and bad options, so that higher values indicate easier tasks.
The performance of the outcome-bonus model is depicted by the
blue surface, and the performance of the prior model is depicted
by the red surface.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Performance of social learning models for typical
learning parameters. (This figure presents the same data as Figure
S3 in a different format.) Each subplot shows average payoffs of
the two social learning models for different levels of social
influence. The difficulty of the basic learning task (higher values
indicate easier tasks) is varied along the global y-axis with easy
tasks at the top and hard tasks at the bottom. The three columns
show results for different qualities of advice. In sum, the figure
indicates that the outcome-bonus model generally performs better.
The prior model only performs better when, at the same time, (a)
the task is hard, (b) bad advice is more likely, and (c) the social
The Neural Basis of Following Advice
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outcome-bonus can be larger than the payoff difference between
good and bad options, so that the outcome-bonus model
consistently prefers the recommended but bad option.
(TIF)
Figure S5 Performance differences in the social learning models
across different learning parameters. Panel A shows the perfor-
mance differences of the models. That is, the mean payoff of the
outcome-bonus model minus the mean payoff of the prior model
for typical learning parameters and 50% correct advice, while
varying the impact of social influence (x-axis) and difficulty (y-axis).
Panels C shows replications of the different difficulty and social
learning parameters examined in Panel A for different learning
rates (on the x-axis) and choice sensitivities (on the y-axis). Panels B
and D show results of the same analysis for 25% and 75% good
advice. Note that hotter colors (red and yellow) indicate an
advantage of the outcome-bonus model, cooler colors (blue and
cyan) indicate an advantage of the prior model, and neutral color
(green) indicates similar performance of the two models.
(TIF)
Figure S6 The results of an alternative fMRI analysis optimized
to detect correlations of BOLD response and prediction errors.
The left panel shows a region in the ventral striatum that correlates
positively with prediction errors for recommended and non-
recommended options (x=210, y=6, z=28, max z-value=3.1).
The right panel shows the results of contrasting the intercept
regressors for recommended minus non-recommended feedback
(x=24, y=10, z=4, max z-value=3.2). The effect of advice on
feedback signals identified in this analysis comprises the same
region as identified in the original analysis and reported in the
main text.
(TIF)
Figure S7 The results of a supplementary analysis, investigating
potential changes in the outcome-bonus signal over time. This
analysis was based on the original analysis, to which we added two
more regressors capturing (f) gain feedback- and (g) loss feedback-
related activity after following advice for the second half of trials,
in which participants chose the recommended option. Important-
ly, in this analysis, we found the same outcome-bonus signal in the
septal area as identified in the original analysis (shown in Figure
S8). Parameter estimates for regressors (f) and (g) did not differ
significantly from zero in regions implementing the outcome-
bonus. Instead, we found a reduced BOLD signal for feedback in
regions commonly associated with theory-of-mind (TOM) reason-
ing or negative feedback after following advice. These results are
significant after whole brain correction, based on a z-threshold of
2.576 and a minimum cluster size of 152 voxels (cluster size
criterion obtained with AFNI AlphaSim, see Text S1). (A)
Reduced activation for feedback after following advice (i.e. the
contrast vector had a 21 for regressors (f) and (g) and 0 for all
other regressors) in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex/paracingu-
late cortex (DMPFC/PCC, x=26, y=42, z=16, max z-
value=3.13). (B) Reduced activation for feedback after following
advice in the superior temporal sulcus (STS, x=264, y=28,
z=26, max z-value =3.21). The PCC and STS are commonly
associated with reasoning about the intentions and traits of other
people and have been shown to be active when participants play
economic games like the trust game [48,49]. (C) Reduced
activation for positive feedback after advice-following in the STS
(x=262, y=26, z=24, max z-value =3.11). (D) Reduced
activation for negative feedback after following advice in the
rostral cingulate zone (RCZ, x=220, y=24, z=48, max z-value
=3.21). The RCZ is associated with processes of conflict
monitoring and learning from negative feedback [50]. (E) Reduced
activation for negative feedback after following advice in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, x=22, y=2, z=32, max z-value
=3.21). In sum, these fMRI results suggest that the neural
outcome-bonus does not change over the course of learning. Note
that this is consistent with our finding that the dynamic outcome-
bonus models do not fit participants’ behavior better than the
models with a constant outcome-bonus. Furthermore, these results
are consistent with the hypothesis that participants reason more
about the advisors’ intentions and capabilities during the first half
of the experiment and that they experience negative feedback as
less conflicting after following advice in the later stages of the
experiment (possibly because they have learned that losses cannot
be avoided).
(TIF)
Figure S8 Result for the contrast of feedback advised .
feedback not advised of the control analysis described in the
legend to Figure S7. We still identified an outcome-bonus signal
for feedback after following advice versus not following advice in
the septal area/left caudate (x=26, y=12, z=6, max z-value
=3.26) over the entire experiment, after controlling for the effects
of time by introducing additional regressors modeling feedback
effects for the second half of the experiment (details in the legend
to Figure S7).
(TIF)
Figure S9 A number of regions showed greater activation when
participants decided to not follow advice. (A) Left supplementary
motor area (SMA, x=228, y=26, z=60, max z-value =3.33),
(B) right post-central gyrus (x=46, y=234, z=60, max z-value
=3.56), (C) left central operculum with extension into caudate and
putamen (x=234, y=8, z=10, max z-value =3.05), (D) and left
VST (x=228, y=26, z=60, max z-value =3.07). Results shown
in (A, B, C) are significant after whole brain correction, based on a
z-threshold of 2.576 and a minimum cluster size of 152 voxels
(cluster size criterion obtained with AFNI AlphaSim). With a
cluster size of 81 voxels, the VST result approaches significance
when correcting for multiple comparison in the reward ROI
(minimum cluster size would be 92 voxel). In particular, the
reduced activation in the SMA and the VST suggests that
following advice is accompanied by a reduction in decision-related
brain activity. A similar result has been reported for following
advice in the context of financial decisions [35].
(TIF)
Table S1 The table provides basic information about the
compared models. Columns under the header ‘‘Implemented
social learning mechanisms’’ contain a ‘‘+’’ if a particular model
implemented the respective social learning mechanism. LL is the
log likelihood, AIC is the Aikake information criterion, BIC is the
Bayesian information criterion (see supplementary methods for
details).
(DOC)
Table S2 Values represent the percentage out of 21 participants
for whom the prior, the outcome-bonus, or the prior+outcome-
bonus model is better than the alternative models.
(DOC)
Table S3 Parameter values for the prior + outcome-bonus
model.
(DOC)
Text S1 The text contains a detailed description of the computer
simulation procedure and additional simulation results (see also
Figures S2–S4). In addition, supporting materials and methods
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S4), behavioural results (see also Figure S5), all social learning
models and modelling results (see also Tables S1 and S2), the
model fitting procedure, and the fMRI analysis.
(DOC)
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